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Arguably, 401(k) plan fees1 are the biggest policy issue in the retirement world
today. They potentially raise questions about the fundamental business underpinnings
of the principal form of retirement savings for the last twenty years. As an indication
of their significance, three branches of the federal government: administrative, judicial,
and legislative; are currently and simultaneously addressing 401(k) plan fees.
This Article will not attempt to provide a comprehensive discussion of 401(k) plan
fees and all of the issues that they raise.2 Instead, the Article will focus on recent
governmental activity regarding 401(k) plan fees. It will begin by discussing three
recent DOL initiatives governing the disclosure of plan fees: (1) the revision of Form
5500, and particularly Schedule C; (2) the proposed section 408(b)(2) regulations; and
(3) the proposed section 404(a)/404(c) regulations. The Article will then turn to the
401(k) plan fee litigation. Specifically, it will discuss two leading decisions, Haddock
v. Nationwide Financial Services3 and Hecker v. Deere,4 which represent opposite
ends of the spectrum of judicial resolution of 401(k) plan fee disputes. Finally, the
Article will discuss recent legislative proposals to mandate greater disclosure of 401(k)
plan fees.
§ 17.02 DOL INITIATIVES
The Department of Labor (DOL) has focused on 401(k) plan fees for more than a
decade. Following a number of media reports criticizing excessive 401(k) plan fees,5
1 For an overview of the structure of 401(k) plan fees, see, Richard W. Kopcke, et al., The Structure
of 401(k) Fees, Center for Retirement Research at Boston College Issue Brief No. 9-3 (Feb. 2009).
2 For more general, recent discussions of plan fees and the issues they raise, see, for example, Debra
A. Davis, How Much is Enough? Giving Fiduciaries and Participants Adequate Information about Plan
Expenses, 41 The John Marshall L. Rev. 1005 (2008); Matthew D. Hutcheson, Uncovering and
Understanding Hidden Fees in Qualified Retirement Plans, 15 Elder L. J. 323 (2007); and Jonathan Barry
Forman, The Future of 401(k) Plan Fees, NYU Review of Employee Benefits and Executive
Compensation 9-1 (2007).
3 419 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D. Conn. 2006).
4 556 F.3d 575 (7th Cir. 2009).
5 See generally Donald J. Myers, Current Insurance Issues Under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, Understanding Variable Insurance Products 225-226 (PLI Jan. 1999) (“During 1997,
there were a number of news reports giving publicity to problems with fees being charged to participants
in 401(k) plans”). See, e.g., Penelope Wang, Protect Yourself Against the Great Retirement Rip-Off:
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the DOL held a public hearing on the subject on November 12, 1997.6 In April 1998,
the DOL released a lengthy report, entitled “Study of 401(k) Plan Fees and
Expenses,”7 that examined the incidence, structure, and magnitude of fees and
expenses charged to 401(k) plan sponsors and/or participants. In July 1998, the DOL
released a booklet, entitled “A Look at 401(k) Plan Fees,”8 that was designed to
provide plan participants with general guidance on how to evaluate plan fees. In
addition, the DOL provided guidance for plan sponsors in the form of a booklet,
entitled “A Look at 401(k) Plan Fees for Employers,” which was later replaced by
“Understanding Retirement Plan Fees and Expenses,”9 and by publishing a detailed
worksheet, “The 401(k) Plan Fee Disclosure Form,”10 that plan sponsors may use to
evaluate and compare 401(k) fees by competing vendors.
More recently, the DOL has embarked on three new initiatives to require greater
disclosure of plan fees. First, it issued revisions to Form 5500, and particularly
Schedule C, to require more detailed disclosure of fee information. Second, it proposed
regulations under ERISA section 408(b)(2) to require that plan service providers
disclose to plan fiduciaries the direct and indirect compensation the service providers
will receive and any conflicts of interest that may arise in connection with the service
providers’ services to the plan. Finally, the DOL proposed regulations under ERISA
sections 404(a) and 404(c) that would establish uniform, basic disclosure requirements
for participants and beneficiaries in participant-directed defined contribution plans in
a form designed to encourage and facilitate a comparative review among investment
options. This section will discuss each of these initiatives in more detail.
[1] Revised Form 5500
Sections 101(b)(1) and 104(a) of ERISA require that plan administrators file an
annual report with the Secretary of Labor that, among other things, discloses the
financial condition, investments, and operations of the employee benefit plans they
Excessive 401(k) Fees Skim an Estimated $1.5 Billion a Year from Retirement Savings. Here is How to
Protect Your Nest Egg, Money 96 (April 1, 1997).
6 See 62 Fed. Reg. 53802 (Oct. 16, 1997) (announcing public hearing).
7 Pension & Welfare Benefits Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Study of 401(k) Plan Fees and Expenses
(1998).
8 See Stephen H. Goldberg, et al., 401(k) Plan Fees-Disclosure, Reasonableness, and other Issues,
Conference on Life Insurance Company Products: Current Securities, Tax, ERISA, and State Regulatory
Issues 190 (ALI-ABA Oct. 1998). The booklet is available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/
401kFeesEmployee.pdf.
9 Available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/undrstndgrtrmnt.html.
10 This model form, developed jointly by the American Bankers Association, the Investment
Company Institute, and the American Council of Life Insurers is available at the DOL’s website at
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/401kfefm.pdf.
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administer.11 Plan administrators may satisfy this requirement by filing a Form 5500
“Annual Return/Report of Employee Benefit Plan” and any required statements or
schedules.12
Form 5500 was first developed shortly after ERISA was enacted in 1974. 13 At that
time, defined benefit plans dominated the pension world, and plan fees and expenses
were explicit.14 According to generally accepted accounting principles, any fees and
expenses paid by the plan were reported in the expense section of the pension plan’s
Income and Expense Statement, and the actual fees paid by the plan matched the fees
reported in the plan’s audit report and on the Form 5500.15
The pension world, and the way in which fees and expenses are charged, has
changed dramatically since the enactment of ERISA. Defined contribution plans in
general, and 401(k) plans in particular, are now the principal type of retirement savings
plan, and these plans rely heavily on pooled investment vehicles such as mutual
funds.16 Rather than charging explicit fees, mutual funds and other pooled investment
vehicles typically use an asset-based fee model.17 Under this model, “the investment
management fees and expenses of the mutual fund [or other pooled investment
vehicle] are netted out of its performance on a daily basis in arriving at the mutual
fund’s [or other vehicle’s] net asset value (NAV) and as such, those fees and expenses
are intrinsic to the investment and not easily identifiable by the plan sponsor.”18
Moreover, many plan sponsors have moved to “bundled arrangements”19 under which
administrative costs such as recordkeeping or trustee fees are partially or wholly offset
11 See ERISA Section 103 (detailing information that must be included in annual report).
12 DOL Reg. Sec. 22520.103-1(b)(1).
13 See 40 Fed. Reg. 45143 (Sept. 30, 1975) (notice of proposed Annual Return/Report Forms to be
filed by administrators of pension and welfare benefit plans).
14 ERISA Advisory Council, Report of the Working Group on Plan Fees and Reporting on Form 5500,
at 4.
15 Id. at 4.
16 Id. at 5.
17 Id. at 5.
18 Id. at 5.
19 There are three basic types of “bundled arrangements.” In a “fully bundled” arrangement, a record
keeper provides all of the administrative services and only proprietary investment funds are offered as
investment options. This arrangement is typically offered to small plans. In bundled arrangements
available to most plans with more than $5 million in assets, a record keeper provides comprehensive
administrative services and both proprietary and non-proprietary investment options are available. In the
third type of bundled arrangement, a record keeper provides comprehensive administrative services and
only non-proprietary investment options are available. The Spark Institute, The Case for Employer-
Sponsored Retirement Plans: Fees and Expenses 20 n. 31 (May 2009).
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by “revenue sharing”20 with the mutual funds or other investment vehicles with
asset-based fee structures.21
As a result of this shift in the structure of plan fees, Form 5500 did not do a very
good job of capturing the actual cost of operating a 401(k) plan.22 Accordingly, the
DOL revised Schedule C23 to Form 5500 to require more detailed disclosure of fee
information.24 The changes are intended to increase the transparency of fees and
expenses and ensure “that plan officials obtain the information they need to assess the
compensation paid for services rendered to the plan, taking into account revenue-
sharing arrangements among plan service providers and potential conflicts of inter-
est.”25 Specifically, revised Schedule C, applicable to plans with over 100 participants,
requires disclosure of (1) identifying information for all direct and indirect compen-
sation over $5,000;26 (2) the types of services being provided;27 (3) the relationship of
the service provider to the plan and any party in interest;28 (4) whether the indirect fees
20
“[R]evenue sharing is a broad term that means many different things to different constituents. .... In
the employee benefit community, the term ‘revenue sharing’ is used loosely to describe virtually any
payment that a plan service provider receives from a party other than the plan.” Report of the Working
Group on Fiduciary Responsibilities and Revenue Sharing Practices. See also “Revenue sharing” refers
to an arrangement pursuant to which fees assessed against a participant’s account are shared with the
vendors providing recordkeeping and related administrative services. Richard W. Kopcke, et al., supra
note 1.
21 ERISA Advisory Council, Report of the Working Group on Plan Fees and Reporting on Form 5500,
at 5.
22 Indeed, according to a 2003 Hewitt Associates’ survey, only about a third of plan sponsors even
attempted to calculate the cost of maintaining their plan. Id. at 5 n.3 (citing 2003 Trends and Experience
in 401(k) Plans, Hewitt Associates, LLC, at 79).
23 The DOL did not make any major substantive changes to Schedule A, which provides for the
reporting of insurance information, but did decide that two of the Schedule C changes should be
applicable to Schedule A. First, “compensation paid by the insurer to third parties for recordkeeping and
claims processing services provided to the insurer as part of the insurer’s administration of the insurance
policy is not required to be reported as fees and commission on Line 2 of the Schedule A.” See 72 Fed.
Reg., at 64,746. Second, “occasional and insubstantial non-monetary compensation paid by an insurance
company to agents, brokers, and other persons from the fees and commissions that would otherwise be
required to be reported on the Schedule A” may be excluded. Id. For DOL guidance on the scope of the
Schedule A reporting obligation, see DOL Advisory Opinion 2005-02A.
24 See Revision of Annual Information Return/Reports, 72 Fed. Reg. 64731 (Nov. 16, 2007).
25 72 Fed. Reg., at 64738.
26 Schedule C to Form 5500, Question 2(a). See 72 Fed. Reg., at 64790.
27 Schedule C to Form 5500, Question 2(b). See 72 Fed. Reg., at 64790. A code specifies different
categories for different services. See 72 Fed. Reg., at 64826-27.
28 Schedule C to Form 5500, Question 2(c). See 72 Fed. Reg., at 64790.
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are “eligible” or “ineligible” indirect compensation29 and (5) whether any service
provider failed or refused to provide the fee disclosure information necessary to
complete Schedule C.30 The revised schedule C is effective for all annual report filings
made for plan years beginning on or after January 1, 2009.31
[2] Proposed Section 408(b)(2) Regulations
Section 406(a)(1)(C) of ERISA generally prohibits the furnishing of goods, services,
or facilities between a plan and any party in interest to the plan, including a service
provider.32 Section 408(b)(2) of ERISA exempts from this general prohibited
transaction rule “[c]ontracting or making reasonable arrangement with a party in
interest for office space, or legal, accounting, or other services necessary for the
establishment or operation of the plan if no more than reasonable compensation is paid
therefor.” Currently, the DOL regulations provide little guidance on the meaning of the
term “reasonable” contract or arrangement. The regulations simply state that a contract
or arrangement is not reasonable unless it permits the plan to terminate without penalty
on reasonably short notice.33
On December 13, 2007, the DOL proposed to amend the Section 408(b)(2)
regulations to redefine the meaning of a “reasonable” contract or arrangement to
require that plan service providers disclose to plan fiduciaries the compensation the
service provider will receive, directly or indirectly, and any conflicts of interest that
may arise in connection with the service provider’s services to the plan. The proposed
regulations are intended help plan fiduciaries ensure that the plan only pays
“reasonable” fees and help fiduciaries determine what is “reasonable.”34
The proposed regulations apply to service providers (1) who are fiduciaries under
ERISA or under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940; (2) whose services include one
or more of the following services: banking, consulting, custodial, insurance, invest-
ment advisory (plan or participants), investment management, recordkeeping, securi-
ties or other investment brokerage, or third party administration; or (3) who receive or
29 Schedule C to Form 5500, Question 2(f). See 72 Fed. Reg., at 64790. “Eligible indirect
compensation” includes fees or expense reimbursement payments charged to “investment funds” and
reflected in the value of the plan’s investment or return on the investment. See 72 Fed. Reg., at 64742.
30 Schedule C to Form 5500, Question 4. See 72 Fed. Reg., at 64793.
31 See 72 Fed. Reg., at 64733.
32 Section 3(14)(B) of ERISA defines the term “party in interest” to include “a person providing
services to [the] plan.”
33 See DOL Reg. Sec. 2550.408(b)-2(c).
34 DOL Proposes Fee Disclosure Amendment, 401(k) Handbook Newsletter 9 (Feb. 2008) (“In a press
briefing Bradford P. Campbell, assistant secretary for EBSA, said the proposed rules will help fiduciaries
ensure they pay only ‘reasonable’ fees and should help determine what ‘reasonable’ is.”).
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may receive indirect compensation in connection with providing one or more of the
following services: accounting, actuarial, appraisal, auditing, legal, or valuation
services.35 The preamble to the regulations makes it clear that the regulation would not
apply to contracts or arrangements that are providing benefits to participants and
beneficiaries, rather than providing services to the plan itself.36 In testimony before the
DOL, the Investment Company Institute asked the DOL to clarify that businesses that
service mutual funds, such as brokers and fund accountants, are not service providers
subject to the disclosure rules.37
The proposed regulations require that there be a written contract between the plan
and the service provider38 and that the terms of the contract provide for a variety of
disclosures to be made to the “responsible plan fiduciary” before the contract is entered
into and before a contract is renewed.39 The disclosures must be made to the “best of
the service provider’s knowledge.”40
Specifically, the proposed regulations require that the service provider disclose all
services to be provided to the plan, the compensation or fees received, or to be
received, by the service provider with respect to each service, and the manner (e.g.,
direct or indirect) in which compensation will be received.41 The service provider must
also disclose the method for calculating and repaying any prepaid compensation if the
contract terminates.42 “Compensation or fees” is defined to include money or any other
thing of monetary value, such as gifts, awards, and trips, received, or to be received,
by the service provider.43
With respect to “bundled arrangements,” the proposed regulations provide that the
bundled service provider must disclose the allocation of compensation or fees that are
35 Prop. DOL Reg. Sec. 2550.408b-2(c)(1)(i)(A)–(C); 72 Fed. Reg. 71004.
36 72 Fed. Reg. 70989.
37 ICI Supports Proposal to Improve 401(k) Disclosure, Money Manager’s Compliance Guide
Newsletter 8 (June 2008). See also Melanie Franco Nussdorf, The New Disclosure Rules Under ERISA,
Life Insurance Company Products: Featuring Current SEC, FINRA, Insurance, Tax, and ERISA
Regulatory and Compliance Issues 713, 715 (ALI-ABA Nov. 13–14, 2008) (“Proposed regulation
appeared to suggest that advisers to mutual funds or other non-plan asset vehicles were covered by the
regulation. That suggestion will apparently be corrected in the final rule.”)
38 Prop. DOL Reg. Sec. 2550.408b-2(c)(1)(ii); 72 Fed. Reg. 71004. The writing requirement is
designed to ensure a meeting of the minds between the service provider and responsible plan fiduciary.
72 Fed. Reg. 70989.
39 Prop. DOL Reg. Sec. 2550.408b-2(c)(1)(iii); 72 Fed. Reg. 71004.
40 Id.
41 Prop. DOL Reg. Sec. 2550.408b-2(c)(1)(iii)(A); 72 Fed. Reg. 71004.
42 Prop. DOL Reg. Sec. 2550.408b-2(c)(1)(iii)(A)(4); 72 Fed. Reg. 71005.
43 Prop. DOL Reg. Sec. 2550.408b-2(c)(1)(iii)(A)(1); 72 Fed. Reg. 71004.
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either a separate charge directly against the plan’s investment reflected in the net value
of the investment or that are fees set on a transaction basis, such as finder’s fees,
brokerage commission, and soft dollars.44 The service provider is not required to
disclose the allocation of compensation under a bundled arrangement that does not fit
into either of these two categories.45
The proposed regulations also require that all relationships that may lead to a
conflict of interest be disclosed. Specifically, service providers must disclose: (1)
whether they are acting as a fiduciary;46 (2) any financial or other interest in any
transaction in which the plan will partake in connection with the contract or
arrangement;47 (3) any material, financial, referral or other relationship it has with
various entities48 that may create a conflict of interest for the service provider;49 (4) if
the service provider can affect its own compensation without prior approval from an
independent plan fiduciary;50 and (5) any policies or procedures developed to mitigate
any conflicts of interest that exist.51
The proposed regulations would likely have a relatively modest impact on
independent registered investment advisers (RIAs) because independent RIAs typi-
cally already have written contracts that spell out their services in detail.52 In contrast,
the rules are likely have a significant impact on broker-dealers and financial advisers
because (1) they typically do not have ERISA-specific agreements already in place that
can be modified to meet the disclosure requirements; (2) they must state in the contract
or arrangement whether they are acting as fiduciaries, and it is not always clear
whether they qualify as a functional fiduciary; (3) their compensation is indirect and
varies based on the types of investments selected; (4) they have significant interests
and relationships that may be viewed as conflicts of interest that must be disclosed; and
(5) many do not currently have procedures in place to describe and explain, prior to
44 Prop. DOL Reg. Sec. 2550.408b-2(c)(1)(iii)(A)(3); 72 Fed. Reg. 71005.
45 Id.
46 Prop. DOL Reg. Sec. 2550.408b-2(c)(1)(iii)(B); 72 Fed. Reg. 71005.
47 Prop. DOL Reg. Sec. 2550.408b-2(c)(1)(iii)(C); 72 Fed. Reg. 71005.
48 Those entities include “a money manager, broker, other client of the service provider, or any other
entity.” Prop. DOL Reg. Sec. 2550.408b-2(c)(1)(iii)(D); 72 Fed. Reg. 71005.
49 Prop. DOL Reg. Sec. 2550.408b-2(c)(1)(iii)(D); 72 Fed. Reg. 71005.
50 Prop. DOL Reg. Sec. 2550.408b-2(c)(1)(iii)(E); 72 Fed. Reg. 71005.
51 Prop. DOL Reg. Sec. 2550.408b-2(c)(1)(iii)(F); 72 Fed. Reg. 71005.
52 See Fred Reish et al., The DOL’s Proposed 408(b)(2) Regulation: Impact of the Mandated
Disclosures on Registered Investment Advisers, Reish, Luftman, Reicher & Cohen Bulletin (Feb. 4,
2008).
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sale, all of the direct and indirect compensation they may receive.53
The DOL proposed that the regulation be effective 90 days after the publication of
the final regulation,54 and anticipated that the regulation would be become final on
January 1, 2009.55 In fact, however, the future of the proposed regulations is uncertain.
On January 20, 2009, the date of President Obama’s inauguration, the regulations were
waiting for approval in the Office of Management and Budget.56 A January 20, 2009,
memorandum from the President’s Chief of Staff called for all proposed regulations,
which had not yet be finalized, to be withdrawn and made subject to further review by
the appropriate agency or department head.57 It is not clear when the Obama
administration will turn its attention to the proposed Section 408(b)(2) regulations or
how it might amend the rules. It is unlikely, however, that the regulations will be
completely discarded.
Although the proposed section 408(b)(2) regulations are not yet effective, it would
be prudent for service providers to still make the types of disclosures required by the
proposed regulations.58 As far back as 1997, the DOL has opined that fiduciaries have
an obligation to
assure that the compensation paid directly or indirectly by [a plan to a service
provider] is reasonable, taking into account the services provided to the plan as
well as any other fees or compensation received by the [service provider] in
connection with the investment of Plan assets. The responsible Plan fiduciaries
53 See Fred Reish et al., The DOL’s Proposed 408(b)(2) Regulation: Impact on Broker-Dealers and
Registered Representatives, Reish, Luftman, Reicher & Cohen Bulletin (March 13, 2008). For a
discussion of the likely impact of the regulations on independent recordkeepers, see Fred Reish and Bruce
Ashton, The DOL’s Proposed 408(b)(2) Regulation: Impact on Independent Recordkeepers, Reish,
Luftman, Reicher & Cohen Bulletin (August 2008)
54 72 Fed. Reg. 70994.
55 Richard Loebl, Reporting & Disclosure of Fees for 401(k) and Other Plans - Coping with the New
Regime, 2008 Joint Fall CLE Meeting (Sept 13, 2008) (“The DOL anticipates that this rule will become
final and effective January 1, 2009.”).
56 Michael A. Lawson and Andrew L. Oringer, A Report on Certain Reporting Issues Under ERISA
— Disclosure of Fees for Services and Special Issues for Gifts and Entertainment, Pension Plan
Investments 2009 162 (PLI April 13, 2009).
57 74 Fed. Reg. 4435 (Jan. 26, 2009).
58 See Fred Reish and Bruce Ashton, Update on Service Provider Disclosure Under 408(b)(2), Reish,
Luftman Reicher & Cohen Bulletin 1,1 (Jan. 12, 2009) (“Even without the final regulation, from a risk
management perspective, the prudent course for service providers is to make the types of disclosures
provided for in the proposed regulations); Ellie Behling, Advisers Still Headed for More Fee
Transparency, plan adviser (Jan. 29, 2009) (“[E]ven though the regulations were not finalized,
commission-based advisers should make sure they are disclosing all of their compensation relating to a
plan, including compensation paid by a third- party.”).
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therefore must obtain sufficient information regarding any fees or other compen-
sation that the [service provider] receives with respect to the Plan’s invest-
ments...to make an informed decision whether [the service provider’s] compen-
sation for services is no more than reasonable.59
Even absent final regulations, plan fiduciaries risk being found to have breached their
fiduciary duties and have engaged in a prohibited transaction under ERISA section
406(b)(3) if plan service providers do not provide plan fiduciaries with adequate
disclosure of the service provider’s direct and indirect compensation.
[3] Proposed Section 404(a)/Section 404(c) Regulations
ERISA requires that plan sponsors provide all participants with a summary plan
description,60 account statement,61 and summary annual report.62 While these docu-
ments may contain some information about plan fees, they are not required to disclose
information about plan fees individual plan participants may bear.
Plan sponsors that seek to have their individual account plans qualify for the section
404(c) safe harbor63 must disclose certain plan fee information to plan participants.
Specifically, the current section 404(c) regulations require, among other things, that
plan participants be automatically provided with (1) “a description of any transaction
fees and expenses which affect the participant’s or beneficiary’s account balance in
connection with the purchases and sales of interests in investment alternatives (e.g.,
commission, sales loads, deferred sales charges, redemption or exchange fees);”64 and
(2) fund prospectuses.65 In addition, if the participant requests, plan participants must
be provided with, among other things, (1) “a description of the annual operating
expenses of each designated investment alternative (e.g., investment management fees,
administrative fees, transaction costs) which reduce the rate of return to participants
and beneficiaries, and the aggregate amount of such expenses expressed as a
59 DOL Advisory Opinion 97-16A. See also DOL Advisory Opinion 97-15A for similar language.
60 ERISA Section 101(a)(1).
61 ERISA Sections 101(a)(2) and 105(a) and (3).
62 ERISA Sections 101(a)(2) and 104(b)(3).
63 Under ERISA, exercising control over plan assets, including investing plan assets, is a fiduciary act,
and sections 404(a)(1)(A) and 404(a)(1)(B) of ERISA require that fiduciaries act prudently and solely in
the interest of plan participants and beneficiaries. ERISA section 404(c), however, provides an exception
to that general rule. Specifically, Section 404(c) provides that in plans permitting participants to exercise
control over the assets in their own individual accounts, (1) the participant is not deemed to be a fiduciary
by reason of the exercise of such control, and (2) no other fiduciary has any liability for any loss, or by
reason of any breach, resulting from such exercise of control.
64 DOL Reg. Section 2550.404c-1(b)(2)(i)(B)(1)(v).
65 DOL Reg. Section 2550.404c-1(b)(2)(i)(B)(1)(viii).
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percentage of average net assets of the designated investment alternative;”66 and (2)
fund performance history, after deduction of expenses.67
The current 404(c) regulations do not require disclosure of fee information in a
format that enables participants and beneficiaries to easily compare fee and expenses
across investment options. Instead, participants must sift through multiple documents
that are not always automatically disclosed to them to compare the fees of different
investment options.68
Moreover, not all participant-directed defined contribution plans are subject to the
404(c) regulations. The regulations only apply if the plan sponsor wishes to have the
plan fall within the 404(c) safe harbor. According to recent Form 5500 data, 54 percent
of 401(k) plans — representing 64 percent of 401(k) participants — were classified as
404(c) plans while 87 percent of 401(k) plans — representing 92 percent of 401(k)
participants — have participants direct their investments.69
In light of these limitations under current law, on July 23, 2008, the DOL proposed
regulations that would establish uniform, basic disclosure requirements for partici-
pants and beneficiaries in participant-directed defined contribution plans, without
regard to whether the plan is a section 404(c) plan.70 In addition, the proposed
regulations would require participants and beneficiaries to be provided with
investment-related information in a form that would encourage and facilitate a
comparative review among investment options.71
The proposed regulations begin with the proposition that in participant-directed
individual account plans, plan fiduciaries have a fiduciary duty to ensure, through
“regular and periodic” disclosure, that plan participants and beneficiaries understand
their rights and responsibilities with respect to investing the assets in their individual
accounts, and have enough information about the plan, its fees and expenses,
investment options (and any fees and expenses associated with those investment
options) to make informed decisions about the management of their individual
accounts.72 In order to satisfy this obligation, plan fiduciaries must provide all
participants and beneficiaries who have the right to direct their investments with
66 DOL Reg. Section 2550.404c-1(b)(2)(i)(B)(2)(i).
67 DOL Reg. Section 2550.404c-1(b)(2)(i)(B)(2)(iv).
68 See U.S. General Accountability Office, Changes Needed to Provide 401(k) Plan Participants and
the Department of Labor Better Information on Fees, GAO-07-21, at 18 (Nov. 2006) [hereinafter GAO
Report].
69 Id. at 17.
70 73 Fed. Reg. 43014.
71 Id.
72 DOL Prop. Reg. Sec. 2250.404a-5(a); 73 Fed. Reg. 43039.
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specific disclosure about “plan related information” and “investment-related” infor-
mation.73
There are three basic types of “plan related” information that must be disclosed: (1)
general information about the plan and directing investments; (2) the day-to-day
administrative expenses of the plan that are charged to participant accounts; and (3)
expenses that apply to a participant’s account on an individual rather than plan-wide
basis.74
With respect to general plan information, the proposed regulations require disclo-
sure of (1) how participants and beneficiaries may give investment instructions; (2)
any limitations on such instructions, such as restrictions on transfer to or from a
designated investment alternative; (3) the exercise of voting, tender, and similar rights
and any restrictions on those rights; (4) the designated investment alternatives
available under the plan; and (5) any designated investment managers to whom
participants and beneficiaries may give investment instructions.75
With respect to administrative expenses, the proposed regulations require that
participants and beneficiaries be given an explanation of the “day-to-day” operational
expenses of the plan that may be charged against their individual accounts (such as
legal, accounting and recordkeeping expenses) and a description of how those
expenses will be allocated to participant accounts (such as pro rata or per capita).76
This information must initially be disclosed on or before the date the participant
becomes eligible to participate in the plan, and at least annually thereafter.77 In
addition, the proposed regulations require that participants and beneficiaries be
furnished with quarterly statements providing the dollar amounts actually charged
during the preceding quarter to the participants’ or beneficiaries’ accounts for
administrative services, and a general description of the services to which the charges
relate.78 The administrative charge does not have to be broken out to disclose the cost
for each specific service; one aggregate dollar amount may be reported for the
administrative expenses attributable to each individual account.79
With respect to individual expenses, the proposed regulations require that partici-
pants and beneficiaries be given an explanation of any fees and expenses that may be
charged against their individual account for services provided on an individual, rather
73 DOL Prop. Reg. Sec. 2250.404a-5(b); 73 Fed. Reg. 43039.
74 DOL Prop. Reg. Sec. 2250.404a-5(c); 73 Fed. Reg. 43039.
75 DOL Prop. Reg. Sec. 2250.404a-5(c)(1); 73 Fed. Reg. 43039.
76 DOL Prop. Reg. Sec. 2250.404a-5(c)(2)(i); 73 Fed. Reg. 43039.
77 Id.
78 DOL Prop. Reg. Sec. 2250.404a-5(c)(2)(ii); 73 Fed. Reg. 43039.
79 73 Fed. Reg. 43016.
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than plan wide, basis, such as fees for plan loans, qualified domestic relations orders,
or fees for investment advice or similar services that are charged on an individual
basis.80 This information must initially be disclosed on or before the date the
participant becomes eligible to participate in the plan, and at least annually thereaf-
ter.81 In addition, the proposed regulations require that participants and beneficiaries be
furnished with quarterly statements identifying the dollar amount actually charged
during the preceding quarter to the individual account for individual services and a
description of the services to which the charges relate.82
In addition to the plan related information, the proposed regulations require that
participants and beneficiaries receive specific information about each of the plan’s
“designated investment alternatives,” including the associated fees, expenses, and
performance history for each in a format that allows for comparison across the
designated investment alternatives. Like the current 404(c) disclosure regime, some of
the information must be provided automatically while other information need only be
provided upon request. Unlike the current 404(c) regulations, the proposed regulations
require that fund expense ratios and performance history be provided automatically
while fund prospectuses need only be provided upon request.
Four basic types of “investment-related information” must be provided automati-
cally on or before the date of eligibility and at least annually thereafter: (1) identifying
information; (2) performance data; (3) benchmark data; and (4) fee and expense
information.83
With respect to identifying information, the proposed regulations require disclosure
of (1) the name of each designated investment alternative; (2) a website that is
sufficiently specific to lead participants and beneficiaries to supplemental information
regarding the investment alternative; (3) the type or category of the investment (e.g.,
money market mutual fund, balanced fund, large cap fund); and (4) the fund’s
management type (e.g. actively or passively managed).84
For investment alternatives with respect to which the return is fixed (e.g., a
guaranteed investment contract), the plan fiduciary must provide both the fixed rate of
return and the term of the investment.85 For investment alternatives with respect to
which the return is not fixed (e.g., an equity index fund), the fiduciary must provide the
“average annual total return” (expressed as a percentage) of the investment for the
80 DOL Prop. Reg. Sec. 2250.404a-5(c)(3)(i); 73 Fed. Reg. 43039.
81 Id.
82 DOL Prop. Reg. Sec. 2250.404a-5(c)(3)(ii); 73 Fed. Reg. 43039.
83 DOL Prop. Reg. Sec. 2250.404a-5(d)(1); 73 Fed. Reg. 43039-40.
84 DOL Prop. Reg. Sec. 2250.404a-5(d)(1)(i); 73 Fed. Reg. 43039-40.
85 DOL Prop. Reg. Sec. 2250.404a-5(d)(1)(ii); 73 Fed. Reg. 43040.
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following periods, if available: one-year, five-year, and ten-year, measured as of the
end of the applicable calendar year. If the data is not available, the plan must explain
that it is unavailable or inapplicable. This data must be accompanied by a statement
that an investment’s past performance is not necessarily an indication of future
performance.86 The “average annual total return” is defined by reference to standards
applicable to open-end management investment companies registered under the
Investment Company Act of 1940.87 In the preamble to the proposed regulations, the
DOL specifically invited comments on what problems, if any, the proposed definition
would create for investment alternatives that are not registered with the SEC, and
invited suggestions for alternative definitions or approaches.88
For investment alternatives with respect to which the return is not fixed, the
fiduciary must also provide performance data for an appropriate benchmark for
one-year, five-year, and ten-year periods.89
Finally, the fiduciary must provide the following fee and expense information. For
investment alternatives with respect to which the return is not fixed, the fiduciary must
disclose (1) the amount and a description of each share-holder type fee (that is, fees
charged directly against the participant or beneficiary’s investment), such as sales
loads, sales charges, redemption fees, account fees, and mortality and expense fees; (2)
the total annual operating expenses of the investment expressed as a percentage (e.g.,
expense ratio); and a statement indicating that fees and expenses are only one factor
that should be considered when making investment decisions. For investment
alternatives with respect to which the return is fixed, the fiduciary must disclose the
amount and a description of any shareholder-type fees that may apply to a purchase,
transfer or withdrawal of the investment.90
The proposed regulations require that the automatically disclosed investment-
related information be presented in a chart or similar format that would assist
participants and beneficiaries compare the designated investment alternatives.91
In addition to the information that must be provided automatically, the proposed
regulations provide that following information must be provided upon request: (1)
copies of prospectuses or summaries; (2) copies of financial statements or reports; (3)
a statement of share value; and (4) a list of the plan assets comprising the portfolio of
86 DOL Prop. Reg. Sec. 2250.404a-5(c)(d)(i); 73 Fed. Reg. 43040.
87 DOL Prop. Reg. Sec. 2250.404a-5(h)(2); 73 Fed. Reg. 43041.
88 73 Fed. Reg. 43017.
89 DOL Prop. Reg. Sec. 2250.404a-5(d)(1)(iii); 73 Fed. Reg. 43040.
90 DOL Prop. Reg. Sec. 2250.404a-5(d)(iv); 73 Fed. Reg. 43040.
91 DOL Prop. Reg. Sec. 2250.404a-5(d)(2); 73 Fed. Reg. 43040.
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each designated investment alternative and the value of each share.92
The DOL also proposed to amend the section 404(c) regulations to make the section
404(c) disclosure requirements conform with the section 404(a) disclosure require-
ments.93
Like the proposed section 408(b)(2) regulations, the proposed 404(a)/404(c)
regulations were waiting for approval in the Office of Management and Budget on
January 20, 2009,94 and thus fall within the parameters of the President’s Chief of
Staff’s memorandum calling for all proposed regulations, which had not yet been
finalized, to be withdrawn and made subject to further review by the appropriate
agency or department head.95 Again, it is not clear when the Obama administration
will turn its attention to the proposed Section 404(a)/404(c) regulations or how it might
amend the rules.
[4] Summary
For more than a decade, the DOL has focused on 401(k) plan fees and the need for
more and better disclosure. In all of its guidance, the DOL has made it clear that it does
not object, in principle, to the basic 401(k) model in general, or revenue sharing in
particular.96 It simply wants to ensure that plan fees in general, and revenue sharing in
particular, are adequately disclosed.
In recent years, the DOL embarked on three separate initiatives to mandate better
disclosure. It revised the Form 5500 requirements to provide for better disclosure to
the government. Second, it proposed new regulations under ERISA section 408(b)(2)
to mandate greater disclosure to plan fiduciaries. Finally, it proposed regulations under
section 404(a)/404(c) to provide for greater and more uniform disclosure to plan
participants.
The revised Form 5500 requirements are effective for all annual report filings made
for plan years beginning on or after January 1, 2009. Because the proposed section
408(b)(2) and section 404(a)/404(c) regulations were not finalized by the time
President Obama took office, they are now in limbo. It is highly likely that new
92 DOL Prop. Reg. Sec. 2250.404a-5(d)(4); 73 Fed. Reg. 43040.
93 See 73 Fed. Reg. 43043-44 (amending 404(c) regulations).
94 Michael A. Lawson and Andrew L. Oringer, A Report on Certain Reporting Issues Under ERISA
— Disclosure of Fees for Services and Special Issues for Gifts and Entertainment, Pension Plan
Investments 2009 162 (PLI April 13, 2009).
95 74 Fed. Reg. 4435 (Jan. 26, 2009).
96
“The Working Group recognizes that in the DOL’s view, revenue sharing does not involve any
inherent ERISA violations. To the contrary, many of these arrangements may serve to reduce overall plan
costs and provide plans with services and benefits not otherwise affordable to them.” Report of the
Working Group on Fiduciary Responsibilities and Revenue Sharing Practices.
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administration will mandate greater disclosure to plan fiduciaries and plan participants.
It is not clear, however, when such rules will go into effect or the final form they will
take. Even absent final guidance, however, plan service providers and plan fiduciaries
would be well advised to ensure that they provide ample disclosure of plan fees and
revenue sharing arrangements, even if they choose not to follow precisely the guidance
set out in the proposed regulations.
§ 17.03 401(k) FEE LITIGATION
Since 2006,97 about thirty different lawsuits98 have been filed challenging 401(k)
plan fees.99 A single law firm, Schlichter, Bogard & Denton of St. Louis, filed many
of the complaints, although other law firms have also entered the fray.100 Generally, the
complaints allege that the plan fiduciaries breached their duties under ERISA “by
allowing or causing their plans to pay excessive fees and expenses to service
providers.”101 The complaints focus on revenue sharing and contend that the “revenue
sharing payments were not properly disclosed and accounted for in determining
compensation paid to plan service providers.”102
Although revenue sharing is the focus of the complaints, some other practices are
challenged as well. For example, some complaints allege that there was inadequate
disclosure of direct payments from plans to plan sponsors.103 In addition, some
complaints allege that plan fiduciaries acted improperly in their selection of particular
investment options, such as selecting a more expensive class of shares when a less
97 One case, Haddock v. Nationwide Financial Services, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D. Conn. 2006),
was filed 2001. In addition, another case, Mehling v. New York Life Ins. Co, 248 F.R.D. 455, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 16968 (E.D. Pa. 2008) was filed in 1999, and settled for $14 million on March 4, 2008.
98 See Jason H. Lee and Alexander P. Ryan, 401(k) Fee Litigation, (May 19, 2009), available
http://www.groom.com/documents/401_k_FeeLitigationOutlineMay192009.pdf (identifying 29 different
cases including Haddock). See also Gregory L. Ash, Lessons from 401(k) Fee Litigation, ABA Tax
Midyear Meeting (Jan. 10, 2009) (noting that 30+ cases are pending challenging DC plan fee practices).
99 A few of the cases have involved defined contribution plans other than 401(k) plans. See, e.g.,
Montoya v. ING Life Ins. And Annuity Co., copy of complaint available at http:www.erisafraud.com/
Portals/7/documents/ING_Complaint032807.pdf (S.D.N.Y. filed March 28, 2007) (403(b) plan); Daniels-
Hall v. National Education Ass’n, 2007 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 5339 (W.D. Wash. July 11, 2007)
(same).
100 See Grace Carter and Lee Kissman, Excessive Fees Litigation Involving 401(k) Plans: Develop-
ments to Date and Issues for the Future, Banking & Financial Services Policy Report 22, 22 (April 2008).
101 See Steven J. Sacher and Matthew A. Olson, 401(k) sponsors become targets: ERISA actions
center on their fee arrangements with retirement plan consultants, National L. J. (Jan. 8, 2007).
102 Andree M. St. Martin, 401(k) Fee Litigation, PLI Pension Plan Investments 2008: Current
Perspectives 119, 126 (May 1, 2008).
103 Gregory L. Ash, 401(k) Plans in the Cross-Hairs, Spencer Fane Britt & Browne LLP 2 (March
2007).
§ 17.03 REVIEW OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 17-16
(Rel.67S–10/2009 Pub.500)
0016 [ST: 1] [ED: 10000] [REL: 67S] Composed: Tue Dec 1 14:54:39 EST 2009
XPP 8.1C.1 Patch #6 SC_01125 nllp 500 [PW=500pt PD=684pt TW=380pt TD=528pt]
VER: [SC_01125-Local:24 Aug 08 09:30][MX-SECNDARY: 25 Nov 09 08:31][TT-: 25 Jun 09 10:01 loc=usa unit=00500-ch001767s] 0
expensive class of shares was available 104 or offering actively managed mutual funds
rather than index funds.105
Common to the complaints is an argument that expenses and payments were not
adequately disclosed and thus the plan fiduciaries could not rely on ERISA Section
404(c) for protection.106
This Article will not attempt to discuss all of the pending cases.107 Rather, this
Article will focus on two decisions, Haddock v. Nationwide Financial Services108 and
Hecker v. Deere,109 which may be viewed as bookends representing the range of
possible dispositions of these cases.
In Haddock, the Federal District Court for the District of Connecticut bent the rules
of civil procedure and invented new ERISA law regarding the definition of plan assets
to permit the plaintiffs’ complaint to survive a motion for summary judgment. In
Hecker, in contrast, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals liberally applied the rules of
civil procedure and rejected the Secretary of Labor’s interpretation of her Section
404(c) regulations to uphold the district court’s decision to grant the defendants’
motion to dismiss with prejudice.
[1] Haddock v. Nationwide Financial Services110
[a] Facts and Procedural Posture
In Haddock, the trustees111 of a number of 401(k) plans brought suit against
Nationwide claiming that Nationwide violated its fiduciary duties under ERISA
Section 404(a)(1)(A) and (B) by contracting with and retaining “revenue-sharing
payments” from mutual funds and their affiliates.112 In addition, the trustees alleged
that the contracts and retention of revenue sharing payments constituted prohibited
104 Sacher and Olson, supra note 101.
105 St. Martin, supra note 102 at 126
106 Sacher and Olson, supra note 101; Ash, supra note 103 at 3.
107 For a summary of the pending cases and their current dispositions, see Lee and Ryan, supra note
98; ERISA Plan Fees Cases Face Uphill Battle After Seventh Circuit Ruling, 36 BNA Pension & Benefits
Reporter 589 (March 10, 2009) [hereinafter “Uphill Battle”].
108 419 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D. Conn. 2006).
109 556 F.3d 575 (7th Cir. 2009).
110 419 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D. Conn. 2006).
111 The complaint in Haddock was filed in 2001, years before Schlichter, Bogard & Denton initiated
the current spate of litigation, and differs from many of the pending cases in that it was filed by plan
trustees, rather than by plan participants. Nevertheless, it is part of this body of litigation because it
addresses the same basic issue of whether revenue sharing violates ERISA.
112 419 F. Supp. 2d at 158.
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transactions under ERISA Section 406(b).113
Haddock involved a fairly typical 401(k) investment arrangement. Nationwide, as
the plans’ investment provider, offered the 401(k) plans the option of investing in a
variety of mutual funds through variable annuity contracts.114 For group annuity
contract holders, Nationwide offered a selection of funds, and the plans chose a subset
of those funds to be available as investment options for plan participants.115 Plan
participants then made their individual investment decisions, selecting among the
available funds.116 For individual annuity contracts, Nationwide offered a selection of
funds, and individual participants chose to make their investments among the funds
offered by Nationwide.117
Nationwide also retained the authority to delete and substitute mutual funds from its
list of investment options “if, in the judgment of [Nationwide], further investment in
the shares of a Fund should become inappropriate in view of the purposes of the
Contract.”118 At this stage, Nationwide’s authority was apparently limited to deleting
and substituting mutual funds that had already been approved by the plans.119
The plans and participants did not invest directly in the mutual funds.120 Instead,
they invested in one of two Nationwide “variable accounts,” which were unit
investment trusts that held assets from multiple plans and participants.121 The variable
accounts were divided into numerous sub-accounts, with each sub-account corre-
sponding to a particular investment option available under the annuity contracts.122
Nationwide purchased or sold interests in the mutual funds to reflect the sub-accounts’
combined allocations.123 Once the mutual funds received the funds from the
sub-accounts, the mutual funds combined those funds with funds received from other
investors.124
Nationwide allocated “accumulation units,” or “shares” of the corresponding
113 Id.
114 Id. at 159–160.
115 Id. at 161.
116 Id.





122 419 F. Supp. 2d, at 161.
123 Id.
124 Id.
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sub-accounts to the plans and participants to the reflect the amounts contributed to a
particular mutual fund.125 The accumulation units reflected the total amount of money
the plans and participants invested in the variable account or sub-account, and value
of the accumulation units fluctuated with the value of the mutual funds held by the
sub-accounts.126
In the early to mid-1990s, Nationwide “implemented a system under which mutual
funds ma[d]e payments to it based on a percentage of the assets that plans and
participants invested in mutual funds through Nationwide.”127 It is this system of
payments, which Nationwide refers to a “service contract payments” and the plan
trustees call “revenue sharing,” that the plan participants challenged.
On March 7, 2006, the district court denied Nationwide’s motion for summary
judgment. The court held that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
plaintiffs, a reasonable fact finder could find that (1) Nationwide was a fiduciary;128 (2)
the revenue-sharing payments constituted plan assets under a functional approach;129
and (3) Nationwide engaged in a prohibited transaction by receiving the revenue
sharing payments.130
[b] Analysis of Court’s Opinion
In holding that a reasonable fact finder could find that the revenue-sharing payments
constituted plan assets, the court bent the rules of civil procedure and invented new
ERISA law. The plan trustees argued that the revenue-sharing payments were plan
assets because “(1) they would not have been made but for the Plans’ investments
through Nationwide, (2) Nationwide did not contract with the Plan to receive the
payments despite the opportunity to do so, and (3) the payments could be used for the
benefit of the Plans and the participants.”131
The court rejected the plan trustees’ functional approach, and instead applied its own
novel functional approach to determine whether the revenue sharing payments were
plan assets. Under the court’s functional approach, “‘plan assets’ include items a
defendant holds or receives: (1) as a result of its status or its exercise of fiduciary
discretion or authority, and (2) at the expense of plan participants or beneficiaries.”132
125 Id.
126 Id. at 162.
127 419 F. Supp. 2d, at 162.
128 Id. at 164–67.
129 Id. at 167–71
130 Id. at 171.
131 Id. at 168.
132 419 F. Supp. 2d, at 170.
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The court noted that there was no evidence to support the second prong of the test, and
admitted that “[o]rdinarily the absence of evidence supporting an essential element of
plaintiffs’ claim would be fatal at summary judgment.”133 Nevertheless, the court
permitted the plan trustees’ claim to survive the motion for summary judgment
because “Nationwide’s motion is almost entirely based on questions of law, and
because [the court] adopted a functional approach different than that proposed by the
Trustees.”134
In holding that the revenue sharing payments could constitute plan assets, the court
disregarded ERISA Section 401(b)(1).135 Although ERISA does not explicitly define
the term “plan assets,”136 it suggests that in some instances, it may be appropriate to
“look through” a plan’s investment in a separate legal entity and treat the underlying
assets of that entity as plan assets subject to ERISA’s fiduciary rules.137 Nevertheless,
ERISA Section 401(b)(1) makes it clear that the look through rule does not apply to
the underlying assets of a mutual fund.138 The DOL regulations139 limit “the
applicability of the look through rule to investments in entities that do not produce or
sell a product or service or when the entity’s product or service relates to the
investment of capital.”140
The 2007 ERISA Advisory Council’s Working Group on Fiduciary Responsibilities
and Revenue Sharing Practices recommended that the DOL issue guidance to clarify
that “revenue sharing is not a Plan asset under ERISA unless and until it is credited to
the Plan in accordance with the documents governing revenue sharing.”141 Although
133 Id.
134 Id. at 171.
135 In addition, the court’s construction creates a circularity because a fiduciary is defined as someone
who exercises authority or control over plan assets and the first element of the plan asset definition is
fiduciary status. See, Nationwide Wins One, Loses One In Fee Litigation: Troubling Definition of Plan
“Assets” Survives, Spencer Fane Publications (Oct. 4, 2007).
136 For a discussion of the Department of Labor’s guidance on defining plan assets and the rules that
should apply to the allocation of revenue sharing payments once they have been returned to the plan, see
Stephen J. Migausky and Marcia S. Wagner, A Meditation on the Definition of Plan Assets, 39 ASSPA
Journal 1 (No. 1 Winter 2000).
137 ABA Section of Labor and Employment Law, Employee Benefits Law 644-45 (2d ed. 2000)
(citing ERISA Sections 3(21)(B) and 401(b) and (c)).
138
“In the case of a plan which invests in any security issued by an investment company registered
under the Investment Company Act of 1940, the assets of such plan shall be deemed to include such a
security but shall not, solely by reason of such investment, be deemed to include any assets of such
investment company.” ERISA Section 401(b)(1).
139 DOL Reg. Sec. 2510.3-101.
140 Migausky and Wagner, supra note 136, at 1.
141 Report of the Working Group on Fiduciary Responsibilities and Revenue Sharing Practices.
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the DOL has not yet issued such specific guidance, in the premable to the updated
Form 5500 regulations, the DOL did state “The fact that revenue sharing payments
charged against the assets in an investment vehicle are required to be reported on
Schedule C or disclosed under the alternative reporting option would not, by virtue of
the reporting requirement alone, make those revenue sharing payments plan assets
under the plan asset regulation or under ordinary notions of property rights.”142
Without referring to the Haddock decision, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in
Hecker v. Deere cited ERISA Section 401(b)(1) in support of its holding that revenue
sharing fees are not plan assets.143
[2] Hecker v. Deere144
[a] Facts and Procedural Posture
In Hecker v. Deere, three plan participants filed a class action suit against the plans’
sponsor, Deere & Company (“Deere”), the plans’ recordkeeper and directed trustee,
Fidelity Management Trust Company (“Fidelity Trust”), and the investment advisor
for the mutual funds offered as investment options under the plans, Fidelity
Management & Research Company (“Fidelity Research”).145 The plaintiffs alleged
that the defendants violated their fiduciary duties under ERISA in two separate ways:
(1) by providing investment options with excessive fees and costs; and (2) by failing
to disclose adequately the plan’s fee structure to plan participants.146
Like Haddock, Deere involved a fairly typical 401(k) investment arrangement.
Specifically, Fidelity Trust served as trustee to Deere’s two 401(k) plans, advised
Deere about the investments to include in its 401(k) plans, administered the
participants’ accounts, and maintained the plans’ records.147 Each plan permitted
participants to invest in 23 different Fidelity mutual funds, a Deere stock fund, two
investment funds managed by Fidelity Trust, and a brokerage account option,
BrokerageLink, that allowed participants to invest in 2,500 non-Fidelity mutual
funds.148 Plan participants made their own investment decisions, limited only by the
requirement that they invest in a vehicle offered by their plan.149
142 72 Fed. Reg. 64744 (Nov. 16, 2007).
143 556 F.3d, at 584 (“Once the fees are collected from the mutual fund’s assets, they become
Fidelity’s assets-again, not the assets of the Plan.”).
144 556 F.3d 575 (7th Cir. 2009).




149 556 F.3d, at 578.
17-21 401(K) PLAN FEES § 17.03[2][a]
(Rel.67S–10/2009 Pub.500)
0021 [ST: 1] [ED: 10000] [REL: 67S] Composed: Tue Dec 1 14:54:42 EST 2009
XPP 8.1C.1 Patch #6 SC_01125 nllp 500 [PW=500pt PD=684pt TW=380pt TD=528pt]
VER: [SC_01125-Local:24 Aug 08 09:30][MX-SECNDARY: 25 Nov 09 08:31][TT-: 25 Jun 09 10:01 loc=usa unit=00500-ch001767s] 0
Fidelity Research served as the investment advisor for 23 of the 26 investment
options available under the plan.150 Each fund offered by the plans charged a fee,
calculated as a percentage of assets held by the investor.151 All of the Fidelity funds
were available on the open market for the same fee.152
The plan participants alleged that Fidelity Research shared the revenue it earned
from the mutual fund fees with Fidelity Trust, and Fidelity Trust, compensated itself
through those fees rather than charging Deere a direct fee for its services.153 In their
second amended complaint, the plan participants contended, “the fees and expenses
paid by the Plans, and thus borne by Plan participants, were and are unreasonable and
excessive; not incurred solely for the benefit of the Plans and the Plans’ participants;
and undisclosed to participants. By subjecting the Plans and the participants to these
excessive fees and expenses, and by other conduct set forth below, the Defendants
violated their fiduciary obligations under ERISA.”154
The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim and
the plaintiffs appealed.155 In the first appellate decision to address the issue of revenue
sharing, the Seventh Circuit of Appeals affirmed.
[b] Holding
The first substantive issue156 the circuit court addressed was whether Fidelity Trust
and Fidelity Research were functional fiduciaries with respect to the selection of
investment options, the structure of fees, or the provision of information regarding the
fee structure.157 The court found that plaintiffs’ allegation that Fidelity Trust “played
a role” in selecting the plans’ investments did not transform the company into a
150 Id. at 579.
151 Id. at 578.
152 Id. at 579.
153 Id.
154 556 F.3d, at 579.
155 Id. at 578.
156 The first issue the court addressed was whether the trial court erred in considering documents
outside the pleadings in dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court found that the trial
court did not err in considering seven summary plan descriptions (SPDs), two SPD supplements, the Trust
Agreement between Deere and Fidelity Trust, and three fund prospectuses retrieved from Fidelity’s
website for the limited purpose of showing what Fidelity disclosed to plaintiffs. Id. at 582–83.
The court also addressed another procedural question after it considered the plaintiffs’ substantive
claims. Specifically, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim the district court abused its discretion in
denying plaintiffs’ Rule 59(e) motion to present newly discovered evidence to show that Deere did in fact
turn over critical decision making authority to Fidelity. Id. at 590–91.
157 556 F.3d, at 583–84.
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functional fiduciary. The court declared, “Many people help develop and manage
benefit plans — lawyers and accountants, to name two groups — but despite the
influence of these professionals we do not consider them to be Plan fiduciaries.”158
Relying on the plaintiffs’ concession in their complaint that Deere had the “final
authority” in selecting investment options, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that
Fidelity Trust and Fidelity Research were “functional fiduciaries” responsible for
making disclosures and selecting plan assets.
The court prohibited the plaintiffs from raising a “tardy” argument that Fidelity
Trust was a de facto fiduciary. The court found that the plaintiffs’ complaint limited its
allegations to those claiming that Fidelity Trust “played a role” in the decision-making
process and thus the plaintiffs gave the defendants no notice that they might argue that
Fidelity Trust in fact exercised final decision-making authority.159 According to the
court, the defendants would have been “highly prejudiced” if the plaintiffs had been
able to shift their argument to claim that Fidelity Trust was a de facto fiduciary.160
The court then rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that Fidelity Research, and possibly
Fidelity Trust, were fiduciaries because they exercised discretion over the disposition
of the Plans’ assets by determining how much revenue Fidelity Research would share
with Fidelity Trust.161 Without citing Haddock, the court flatly rejected Haddock’s
holding that revenue sharing payments could constitute plan assets; the court held that
fees drawn from the assets of mutual funds are not plan assets.162
The court then turned to the plaintiffs’ claims that Deere breached its fiduciary
duties (1) by failing to inform plan participants that Fidelity Trust received money
from the fees collected by Fidelity Research, and (2) by limiting investment options to
Fidelity Research funds, and thus only offering investment options with excessive
fees.163 With respect to the first, duty to disclose, claim, the court found that Deere
satisfied its duty by disclosing the total fees for the funds and directing the participants
to the prospectuses for information about the fund-level expenses.164 The court was
not particularly troubled by the fact that the SPD supplements suggested that Deere
was paying the administrative costs when the costs were in fact being paid by the
participants through the revenue sharing system. “While Deere may not have been
behaving admirably by creating the impression that it was generously subsidizing its
158 Id. at 584.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 575.
161 Id. at 584.
162 556 F.3d, at 584.
163 Id. at 584–88.
164 Id. at 585–86.
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employees’ investments by paying something to Fidelity Trust when it was doing no
such thing, the Complaint does not allege any particular dollar amount that was
fraudulently stated.”165 The court held that Deere had no duty to disclose any
information about the internal sharing of revenue between Fidelity Trust and Fidelity
Research.166
With respect to the second claim, the court found that “no rational trier of fact could
find, on the basis of the facts alleged in [the] Complaint, that Deere failed to satisfy”
any duty it may have to furnish an acceptable array of investment vehicles.167 In so
finding, the court emphasized the fact that the plans offered 26 investment options,
including 23 retail mutual funds, as well as 2,500 non-Fidelity mutual funds through
BrokerageLink.168
The court then turned to the defendants’ section 404(c) defense. The court found that
“even if [the court] underestimated the fiduciary duties Deere had to its participants,”
ERISA Section 404(c) offered an alternative ground for dismissing the case.169
Recognizing that a trial court should not normally base a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on
an affirmative defense, the circuit court found that the trial court did not err in basing
its dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims on ERISA Section 404(c) because the plaintiffs
explicitly anticipated an ERISA Section 404(c) safe harbor defense and “put it in
play.”170 Restricting its analysis to plaintiffs’ specific challenges, the circuit court saw
“no plausible allegation that the Plans do not comply with [ERISA Section 404(c)].”171
The court described the central question as whether “the imprudent selection of
mutual funds with excessively high fees falls within the safe harbor.”172 The court
declined to address the “abstract question” of whether the safe harbor applies to the
selection of investment options for a plan.173 The court held that even if section 404(c)
“does not shield a fiduciary from an imprudent selection of funds under every
circumstance that can be imagined, it does protect a fiduciary that satisfies the criteria
of [Section 404(c)] and includes a sufficient range of options so that the participants
have control over the risk of loss.”174 According to the court, “any allegation” that the
165 Id. at 585.
166 Id. at 585–86.
167 556 F.3d, at 586.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 587.
170 Id. at 588.
171 Id. at 589.
172 556 F.3d, at 589.
173 Id.
174 Id.
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2,500 mutual funds available through BrokerageLink “did not provide the participants
with a reasonable opportunity to accomplish the three goals outlined in the regula-
tion,175 or control the risk of loss from fees, is implausible.”176 Thus, “[g]iven the
numerous investment options, varied in type and fee, neither Deere nor Fidelity
(assuming for the sake of argument that it somehow had fiduciary duties in this
respect) can be held responsible for those choices.”177
[c] Analysis of Court’s Opinon
There are a number of troubling aspects to the Deere decision. First, in rejecting
plaintiffs’ claim that Deere violated its fiduciary duty by limiting the investment
options to Fidelity Research funds, the court never once mentioned process. It simply
declared that “the undisputed facts leave no room for doubt that the Deere plans
offered a sufficient mix of investments for their participants.”178 “It has long been the
law that prudence is measured largely by the process used by the investing fiduciary
to select the investment.... [The court’s] analysis stands 30 years of case law on its
head.”179
In interpreting ERISA’s fiduciary duties narrowly and the ERISA section 404(c) safe
harbor broadly, the opinion suggested that a plan sponsor could be granted immunity
in selecting its investment options even if it made its selections by throwing a dart at
a list of possible investments, as long as it ultimately offered participants a sufficiently
wide range of investment options.180 By focusing on the broad array of investment
options,181 rather than the process that led to their selection, the decision may
encourage plan sponsors to “eschew the legitimate design choice that involves a
175 The regulations three goals are (1) to be able to materially affect potential return and degree of risk
in the investor’s portfolio; (2) to be able to choose from at least investment alternatives each of which is
diversified and has materially different risk and return characteristics, and (3) to be able to diversity
sufficiently so as to minimize the risk of large losses. 556 F.3d, at 589–90.
176 Id. at 590.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 575.
179 Uphill Battle, supra note 107.
180 Id. (noting that according to plaintiffs’ attorney, Gregory Y. Porter, “under the Deere decision, a
fiduciary ‘can choose funds by throwing darts without any regard to expense, manger reputation, the
bargaining power of a large pension plan, or any other criteria a fiduciary should consider.”). See also
Nevin E. Adams, “IMHO: ‘Winning Ways?” (Feb. 19, 2009), available at http://www.planadviser.com/
compliance/article.php/3708 (Stating that if he were giving advice based on the Deere decision, he would
“advocate giving participants LOTS of fund choices — via a brokerage window if possible,” and would
tell plan sponsors that they “won’t have to worry about being prudent in the selection of the fund options
for the plan because, according to the [Deere] decision, th[e Section 404(c)] safe harbor applies” to the
decision regarding the selection of funds.).
181 The opinion began by noting that the plans offered “a generous choice of investment options.” 556
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smaller targeted group of funds in favor of the broader, open-ended menu.”182 Indeed,
in reporting on the decision, one firm advised, “to the extent that a 401(k) plan does
not have an investment portal, plan sponsors and administrators should immediately
consider addition of such an optional investment vehicle.”183
The most troubling aspect of the court’s opinion is its apparent rejection of the
Secretary of Labor’s interpretation of her own regulations. Although the court declined
to address the “abstract question” of whether the section 404(c) safe harbor applies to
the selection of investment options for a plan,184 the court found that the safe harbor
did apply to the selection of investment options in that case. Contrary to this view, the
preamble to the section 404(c) regulations states that “the act of designating
investment alternatives” and “the ongoing determination that such alternatives and
managers remain suitable and prudent investment alternatives for the plan” are
fiduciary functions “to which the limitation on liability provided by section 404(c) is
not applicable.”185 Footnote 27 to the preamble “reiterates that because such selections
are not a direct and necessary result of any participant direction, fiduciaries to 404(c)
plans are not relieved of liability for any failure to prudently select investment options
under the plan and ‘to periodically evaluate the performance of such vehicles to
determine ... whether [they] should continue to be available as participant investment
options.”186
In holding that Section 404(c) provided the defendants with immunity in the
selection of investment options in that case, the Deere court cited187 Langbecker v.
Electronic Data Systems Corp.188 In Langbecker, a divided panel of the Fifth Circuit
held that a Section 404(c) defense may apply to a claim brought on behalf of a plan
that the plan fiduciaries breached their fiduciary duties by including company stock as
an investment option in a 401(k) plan.189
Although Deere and Langbecker reject the Secretary of Labor’s interpretation of her
F.3d, at 578. It then referred to the range of investment options at least three more times in the course of
the opinion. See Id. at 586 & 590.
182 Uphill Battle, supra note 107.
183 Seventh Circuit Rules on Fiduciary Duties Related to 401(k) Fees, Thompson Hine ERISA
Litigation Update Advisory Bulletin (Feb. 2009).
184 556 F.3d, at 589.
185 57 Fed. Reg. 46922 (Sept. 16, 1991).
186 Brief of the Secretary of Labor, Hilda L. Solis, As Amicus Curiae in Support of Panel Rehearing
6 (filed March 20, 2009), quoting 57 Fed. Reg. 46924 n.27.
187 556 F.3d, at 589.
188 476 F.3d 299 (5th Cir. 2007).
189 Id. at 310–13.
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Section 404(c) regulations, shortly after the Deere decision was rendered, the Federal
District Court for the District of New Hampshire found that the Secretary’s
interpretation should be granted deference and held that plan fiduciaries were not
entitled to a section 404(c) defense against claims that the fiduciaries should not have
included company stock fund as an investment option.190 In its unpublished opinion,
the court offered the following reasons for adopting the Secretary’s interpretation of
the section 404(c) regulations:
First, section 404(c) is unclear as to whether it can be used to bar a claim based
on a fiduciary’s designation of investment options. Second, section 404(c) requires
the DOL to adopt regulations explaining when a participant or beneficiary has
sufficient control over his assets to be subject to a section 404(c) defense. [ERISA
Section 404(c)(1)(A).] Third, the DOL’s implementing regulations are themselves
unclear as to whether section 404(c) applies to a fiduciary’s decision to designate
investment options. Fourth, the DOL reasonably determined in the preamble to its
regulations that losses which result from a fiduciary’s designation decision are
neither a “direct” nor a “necessary” result of a participant’s exercise of control
over plan assets. Finally, both the Supreme Court and the First Circuit have
recognized in similar circumstances that an agency’s reasonable interpretation of
its own regulations in a regulatory preamble is entitled to deference.191
On March 20, 2009, the Secretary of Labor filed an amicus brief192 in support of the
plaintiff’s petition for rehearing of the Deere case on the grounds that (1) the court
rejected the Secretary’s interpretation of her own 404(c) regulations without address-
ing the deference that should be given to the Secretary; and (2) that the possible
ramifications of the court’s decision are more far-reaching than the court may realize.
At the time this article went to press, the court had not yet decided on the plaintiffs’
petition for rehearing.
Although the Deere decision suggests that a plan sponsor need not exercise
190 In re Tyco International, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30609 (D.N.H.).
For a similar holding by a district court in a decision rendered before Hecker, see Kanawi v. Bechtel
Corp., 590 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1232 (N.D. Ca. 2008) (“The DOL has taken a clear position that section
404(c) does not from a party from liability for claims of imprudent selection of Plan investment options.
This position comports with commonsense.”)
191 Id. at 17–18
192 On the same day that the Secretary of Labor filed her amicus brief, a number of industry groups
also filed a joint amicus brief asking the court to rehear the case. The industry groups included AARP,
the National Senior Citizens Law Center, the Pension Rights Center, Fund Democracy, Inc., and the
Consumer Federation of America. A group of five law professors also filed a separate amicus brief in
favor of rehearing the case. Seventh Circuit Receives Four Requests to Rehear Controversial Deere
Decision, 36 BNA Pension and Benefits Reporter 700 (March 24, 2009).
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prudence in selecting plan investment options, a prudent plan sponsor would be
well-advised to heed the Department of Labor’s view that such a decision is not
entitled to Section 404(c) immunity, at least until there is a final resolution on this
issue.193
[3] Summary
Since 2006, about thirty different lawsuits challenging 401(k) plan fees have been
filed. It is too soon to tell how the cases will ultimately resolved.
Undoubtedly, the 401(k) fee cases will cause employers to take their fiduciary
obligations seriously and carefully scrutinize fees, expenses, and revenue sharing.194
Whether they will have a greater impact remains to be seen.
In Haddock v. Nationwide, one of the first decisions rendered in this spate of
litigation, the Federal District Court of Connecticut bent over backwards to keep the
plaintiffs’ complaint alive. In so doing, the court suggested that it was willing to look
beneath the surface and take a close look at revenue sharing arrangements and the
current 401(k) business practices.
In Hecker v. Deere, in contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit bent
over backwards to affirm the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ complaint with
prejudice. The court was persuaded that the 401(k) plans at issue operated within the
parameters of the marketplace and was unwilling to consider a challenge to prevailing
business practices. The court suggested that the marketplace can and should dictate
how 401(k) plans should operate, and any additional fee disclosure mandates must
come from the DOL or Congress.
§ 17.04 LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
In November 2006, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report on
the disclosure of 401(k) plan fees.195 The report found that the majority of 401(k) plan
fees come out of participants’ accounts196 and plan participants do not understand that
193 See Implications of the Deere Decision, BrightScope Blog (Feb. 19, 2009) (“Until the differences
between the court’s interpretation and the DOL’s interpretation get resolved, for the sake of prudence I
imagine most plan sponsors will continue to subscribe to the DOL interpretation.”)
194 Jeffrey Rickman, 401(k) Fee Cases: The New “Hot” Area for Litigation, Georgia Employment
Law Letter (Feb. 2008) (“But the recent burgeoning of lawsuits in this area should make you reassess your
own 401(k) plans. Among other things, you should monitor plan and fund expenses to ensure you have
negotiated the best deal for participants. You should also ensure that expenses connected to plans are
supported by clear, accessible documentation.”); Sacher and Olson, supra note 101 (“At the very least the
fee cases will increase fiduciary diligence and scrutiny of fees, expenses and revenue sharing.”).
195 GAO Report, supra note 68.
196 Id. at 13.
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the fees affect the value of their individual accounts.197 The report recommended that
Congress amend ERISA to (1) require all plan sponsors of individual directed plans to
disclose fee information on each investment option to participants in a way that
facilitates comparison among investment options, and (2) “explicitly” require plan
service providers to disclose to plan sponsors the compensation they receive from
other service providers, such as revenue sharing and third party fees.198
Following the release of the GAO report, in March 2007, the House of Represen-
tatives Committee on Education and the Labor Force held the first of a series of
hearings on retirement plan fees and expenses.199 Those hearings led Representative
George Miller, Chair of the House Committee on Education and Labor, to introduce
H.R. 3185, the 401(k) Fair Disclosure for Retirement Security Act of 2007.200
Described as the “high watermark” in requiring additional disclosure,201 the bill was
intended to simplify 401(k) fees and make them more transparent to participants and
beneficiaries.202 Representative Miller has been quoted as saying the DOL’s proposed
regulations would continue to permit financial firms “to hide many fees” and
introduced H.R. 3185 with the intent of introducing legislation that goes well beyond
the DOL’s proposed requirements.203 Bradford C. Campbell, assistant secretary for the
DOL’s Employee Benefits Security Administration testified at a hearing held by the
House Education and Labor Committee on the bill in October, 2007.204 Campbell
urged Congress to rely on the DOL to improve disclosure through its regulatory
projects rather than enacting new legislation.205
Using the 401(k) Fair Disclosure for Retirement Security Act of 2007 as a
197 Id. at 17.
198 Id. at 29. The Report also recommended that the DOL issue regulations requiring plan sponsors
to report a summary of all fees paid out of plan assets or participant accounts, listing the fees by type. Id.
199 U.S. Congress. House. House Education and Labor Committee. Rep. George Miller Holds A
Hearing On Hidden 401(k) Fees. 110th Cong., 1st sess., 6 March 2007. The March hearing focused
principally on the GAO report. Martha Priddy Patterson, Creating Employee-Managed Retirement Plans
in a Self-Service World: 401(k) Plans’ Condensed History, 17 Thompson’s 401(k) Handbook Newsletter
3 (Feb. 2008).
200 H.R. 3185, 110th Cong., 1st sess. (2007)
201 Andree M. St. Martin, Key 401(k) Plan Disclosure Bill Introduced, Pension, Profit-Sharing,
Welfare, and Other Compensation Plans 255, 259 (ALI-ABA Oct. 4–6, 2007).
202 See DOL Proposes Fee Disclosure Amendment, 17 401(k) Handbook Newsletter 9 (Feb. 2008).
203 Richard Loebl, Reporting & Disclosure Fees for 401(k) and Other Plans — Coping with the New
Regime, 2008 Joint Fall CLE Meeting (Sept. 13, 2008).
204 U.S. Congress. House. House Education and Labor Committee. H.R. 3185, The 401(k) Fair
Disclosure for Retirement Security Act of 2007. 110th Cong., 1st sess., 4 October 2007.
205 See DOL Proposes Fee Disclosure Amendment, 17 401(k) Handbook Newsletter 9 (Feb. 2008).
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blueprint,206 Representative Richard Neal introduced H.R. 3576, the Defined Contri-
bution Plan Fee Transparency Act of 2007,207 on October 7, 2007, and Senator Tom
Harkin introduced S. 2473, the Defined Contribution Fee Disclosure Act of 2007,208
on December 13, 2007.
None of the plan fee disclosure bills introduced in the 110th Congress were enacted.
Senator Harkin and Representatives Miller and Neal introduced substantially similar
bills early in the 111th Congress. Specifically, Senator Harkin introduced S. 401, the
Defined Contribution Fee Disclosure Act of 2009,209 on February 9, 2009. Then, on
April 21, 2009, Representative George Miller introduced H.R. 1984, the 401(k) Fair
Disclosure for Retirement Security Act of 2009. Finally, just before this Article went
to press, Representative Neal introduced H.R. 2779, the Defined Contribution Plan Fee
Transparency Act of 2009, on June 9, 2009. This section will discuss this proposed
legislation and the hearing held on H.R. 1984, the 401(k) Fair Disclosure for
Retirement Security Act of 2009.
[1] S. 401, The Defined Contribution Plan Fee Disclosure Act of 2009
Senator Harkin’s bill, the Defined Contribution Plan Fee Disclosure Act of 2009,
combined aspects of the proposed section 408(b)(2) regulations as well as aspects of
the proposed section 404(a)/404(c) regulations. Specifically, like the proposed section
408(b)(2) regulations, Senator Harkin’s bill requires disclosure to plan administrators,
and like the proposed section 404(a)/404(c) regulations, Senator Harkin’s bill requires
disclosures to plan participants. Senator Harkin’s bill, however, goes beyond the
requirements of the proposed regulations. Unlike the proposed regulations, the bill
requires that all plan fees be broken down into four separate categories: (1) investment
management, (2) recordkeeping and administration, (3) sales charges, and (4) other.
With respect to disclosure to plan administrators, the bill requires, among other
things, that service providers disclose: (1) the services that will be provided,210 (2) the
entities that will be performing the services (including affiliated or third party
providers),211 and (3) the expected total annual charges — expressed either as a
percentage of assets or dollar amount212 — (broken down into four categories: (a)
investment management, (b) recordkeeping and administration, (c) sales charges,
206 Id.
207 H.R. 3567, 110th Cong., 1st sess. (2007).
208 S. 2473, 110th Cong., 1st sess. (2007).
209 S. 401, 111th Cong., 1st sess. (2009).
210 S. 401, Sec. 2(a)(2) (adding 29 U.S.C. Sec. 111(a)(1)).
211 Id.
212 S. 401, Sec. 2(a)(2) (adding 29 U.S.C. Sec. 111(a)(2)).
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including commissions and charges for advisory services, and (d) other).213 In
addition, the service provider must disclose (1) any payments the service provider
receives from unaffiliated persons in connection with the provision of services to the
plan,214 and (2) any financial or personal relationships with the plan sponsor, plan, or
other service provider if the relationships result in a material benefit to the service
provider.215 Where services are provided to the plan without charge or at a discount,
the service provider is required to disclose the extent to which consideration is
otherwise obtained by the service provider by means of charges against the accounts
of the participants or beneficiaries.216
With respect to disclosures to plan participants, the bill requires, among other
things, that plan administrators provide plan participants with advance notice of the
investment options under the plan,217 including information about the investment
objectives, risk level, historical return218 and an investment comparison chart
comparing the potential service fees219 with a breakdown of costs into four categories:
(a) fees that vary depending on the investment option, (b) fees that are assessed as a
percentage of total assets regardless of the investment option, (c) administration and
transaction-based fees, including plan loan origination fees, possible redemption fees,
and possible surrender charges, and (d) other fees.220
[2] H.R. 1984, The 401(k) Fair Disclosure for Retirement Security Act of
2009
Representative Miller’s bill, H.R. 1984, the 401(k) Fair Disclosure for Retirement
Security Act of 2009,221 is similar, though not identical to Senator Harkin’s bill. Like
Senator Harkin’s bill, it would require disclosure to both plan administrators and to
plan participants and would require that all plan fees be broken down into four separate
categories.
With respect to the disclosure to plan administrators, the bill requires, among other
things, that the service provider disclose (1) the services that will be provided and (2)
the total expected annual charges — expressed as a total aggregate dollar amount,
213 S. 401, Sec. 2(a)(2) (adding 29 U.S.C. Sec. 111(b)(1)).
214 S. 401, Sec. 2(a)(2) (adding 29 U.S.C. Sec. 111(c)(1)(A)).
215 S. 401, Sec. 2(a)(2) (adding 29 U.S.C. Sec. 111(c)(1)(B)).
216 S. 401, Sec. 2(a)(2) (adding 29 U.S.C. Sec. 111(e)).
217 S. 401, Sec. 2(a)(2) (adding 29 U.S.C. Sec. 112).
218 S. 401, Sec. 2(a)(2) (adding 29 U.S.C. Sec. 112(b)).
219 S. 401, Sec. 2(a)(2) (adding 29 U.S.C. Sec. 112(c)).
220 S. 401, Sec. 2(a)(2) (adding 29 U.S.C. Sec. 112(c)(2)).
221 H.R. 1984, 111th Cong., 1st sess. (2009).
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although it may also be expressed as a percentage of assets222 (broken down into four
separate categories: (a) administrative and recordkeeping, (b) transaction fees, (c)
investment management, and (d) other fees.)223 In addition, the bill requires the
disclosure of (1) any payments the service provider receives from unaffiliated persons
in connection with the provision of services to the plan, including any payments
received for including certain investment options as part of a menu of investment
options,224 and (2) any personal and financial relationships with the plan sponsor, plan,
or other service provider if the relationship results in material benefit to the service
provider.225 Where services are provided to the plan without charge or at a discount,
the service provider is required to disclose the extent to which consideration is
otherwise obtained by the service provider by means of charges against the accounts
of the participants or beneficiaries.226
With respect to disclosure to plan participants, the bill requires, among other things,
that plan administrators provide plan participants with advance notice of the
investment options under the plan,227 including the investment objective, risk level,
and historical return,228 and a plan fee comparison chart comparing the potential
fees229 with a breakdown of fees into four categories: (a) fees that vary depending on
the investment option, (b) fees that are assessed as a percentage of total assets
regardless of the investment option, (c) administration and transaction-based fees,
including plan loan origination fees, possible redemption fees, and possible surrender
charges, and (d) other fees.230
In addition to imposing the disclosure requirements discussed above, the bill would
also amend ERISA 404(c) to provide that a plan must include at least one low cost
passively managed index fund in order to qualify for the 404(c) safe harbor.231
[3] H.R. 2779, The Defined Contribution Plan Fee Transparency Act of
2009
Representative Neal’s H.R. 2779, the Defined Contribution Plan Fee Transparency
222 H.R. 1984 Sec. 2(a)(2) (adding 29 U.S.C. Sec. 111(a)(3)).
223 H.R. 1984 Sec. 2(a)(2) (adding 29 U.S.C. Sec. 111(a)(1) & (2)).
224 H.R. 1984 Sec. 2(a)(2) (adding 29 U.S.C. Sec. 111(a)(6)(1)(A)).
225 H.R. 1984 Sec. 2(a)(2) (adding 29 U.S.C. Sec. 111(a)(6)(1)(B)).
226 H.R. 1984 Sec. 2(a)(2) (adding 29 U.S.C. Sec. 111(a)(8)).
227 H.R. 1984 Sec. 2(a)(2) (adding 29 U.S.C. Sec. 111(b)(1)).
228 H.R. 1984 Sec. 2(a)(2) (adding 29 U.S.C. Sec. 111(b)(2)(B)).
229 H.R. 1984 Sec. 2(a)(2) (adding 29 U.S.C. Sec. 111(b)(3)).
230 H.R. 1984 Sec. 2(a)(2) (adding 29 U.S.C. Sec. 111(b)(3)(B)).
231 H.R. 1984 Sec. 3.
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Act of 2009,232 differs from Harkin and Miller’s bills in that Neal’s bill would impose
disclosure requirements through an amendment to the Internal Revenue Code rather
than through an amendment to ERISA. Substantively, however, Representative Neal’s
bill is not significantly different from the other two bills. Like Senator Harkin’s bill and
Representative Miller’s bill, Representative Neal’s bill requires that disclosure be
made to both plan participants and plan administrators, and that bundled providers
break down their fees.
With respect to disclosure to plan administrators, Senator Neal’s bill requires service
providers to provide (1) a detailed and itemized list of all the services to be provided
under the contract,233 (2) an estimate of total fees,234 and (3) a schedule of any
transaction charges the participants may face.235 Bundled service providers must
separate the fees charged under the contract into fees for investment management and
fees for administration and recordkeeping and must disclose any amounts that will be
paid to intermediaries or other third parties.236 Service providers must also disclose
whether they expect to receive payments from third parties in connection with
providing services to the plan, and if so, must name those parties and the amount
expected to be received from each.237 Providers are also required to disclose whether
they may benefit from the offering of proprietary investment products or those of third
parties238 and whether the investment products offered to the plan are available at other
price levels.239
With respect to disclosure to plan participants, the bill requires employers to provide
employees with two separate disclosures regarding plan investments and fees. First,
prior to enrollment and once a year thereafter, the bill provides that for each of the
plan’s investment alternatives, the employer must disclose (1) the investment
alternative’s investment objective, risk and return characteristics, and investment
manager,240 (2) whether it is actively or passively managed, and the difference
between these investment styles,241 (3) its returns over the prior 1, 5, and 10-year
232 H.R. 2779, 111th Cong., 1st sess. (2009).
233 H.R. 2779, Sec. 2(a) (adding 26 U.S.C. Sec. 4980I(B)).
234 H.R. 2779, Sec. 2(a) (adding 26 U.S.C. Sec. 4980I(d)(I)(A)).
235 H.R. 2779, Sec. 2(a) (adding 26 U.S.C. Sec. 4980I(C)).
236 H.R. 2779, Sec. 2(a) (adding 26 U.S.C. Sec. 4980I(d)(2)(D)).
237 H.R. 2779, Sec. 2(a) (adding 26 U.S.C. Sec. 4980I(d)(2)(E)).
238 H.R. 2779, Sec. 2(a) (adding 26 U.S.C. Sec. 4980I(d)(2)(F)).
239 H.R. 2779, Sec. 2(a) (adding 26 U.S.C. Sec. 4980I(d)(2)(G)).
240 H.R. 2779, Sec. 2(a) (adding 26 U.S.C. Sec. 4980H(e)(2)(B)(ii)(I)).
241 H.R. 2779, Sec. 2(a) (adding 26 U.S.C. Sec. 4980H(e)(2)(B)(ii)(II)).
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periods242 in comparison to a benchmark,243 and (4) fees and expenses in connection
with the purchase or sale of interests in the investment alternative.244 The bill also
requires employers to disclose the annual operating expenses for each investment
alternative and whether the fees pay for services beyond investment management.245
In addition, participants must be advised about any separate fees that will be charged
for plan administration246 as well as a notice of any separate charges for other plan
services.247 In addition to the initial and annual disclosure described above, each
quarter, employers must provide participants with information about the investments
they have selected and the fees applicable to their accounts.248 The quarterly notices
must describe the investment alternatives in which the participant was invested and the
percentage of the participant’s account each alternative represented,249 the risk and
return characteristics of each alternative,250 and whether the alternatives were actively
or passively managed.251 With respect to fees, the quarterly notices must describe the
annual operating expenses for each investment alternative,252 any sales charges for the
alternatives the participant has selected,253 separate charges for plan administration,254
and any deductions for participant-initiated services.255
[4] Hearing on H.R. 1984, The 401(k) Fair Disclosure for Retirement
Security Act of 2009
On April 22, 2009, the Subcommittee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions of
the House Committee on Education and Labor held a hearing on Representative
Miller’s H.R. 1984, The 401(k) Fair Disclosure for Retirement Security Act of
2009.256 In his prepared opening remarks, Representative Robert Andrews, Chair of
the House Subcommittee on Health, Labor and Pensions declared, “The lack of
242 H.R. 2779, Sec. 2(a) (adding 26 U.S.C. Sec. 4980H(e)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)).
243 H.R. 2779, Sec. 2(a) (adding 26 U.S.C. Sec. 4980H(e)(2)(B)(ii)(V)).
244 H.R. 2779, Sec. 2(a) (adding 26 U.S.C. Sec. 4980H(e)(2)(B)(ii)(VI)).
245 H.R. 2779, Sec. 2(a) (adding 26 U.S.C. Sec. 4980H(e)(2)(B)(iii)).
246 H.R. 2779, Sec. 2(a) (adding 26 U.S.C. Sec. 4980H(e)(2)(B)(iv)).
247 H.R. 2779, Sec. 2(a) (adding 26 U.S.C. Sec. 4980H(e)(2)(B)(v)).
248 H.R. 2779, Sec. 2(a) (adding 26 U.S.C. Sec. 4980H(e)(3)).
249 H.R. 2779, Sec. 2(a) (adding 26 U.S.C. Sec. 4980H(e)(3)(B)(v)(I)).
250 H.R. 2779, Sec. 2(a) (adding 26 U.S.C. Sec. 4980H(e)(3)(B)(v)(III)).
251 H.R. 2779, Sec. 2(a) (adding 26 U.S.C. Sec. 4980H(e)(3)(B)(v)(II)).
252 H.R. 2779, Sec. 2(a) (adding 26 U.S.C. Sec. 4980H(e)(3)(B)(v)(IV)).
253 H.R. 2779, Sec. 2(a) (adding 26 U.S.C. Sec. 4980H(e)(3)(B)(vi)).
254 H.R. 2779, Sec. 2(a) (adding 26 U.S.C. Sec. 4980H(e)(3)(B)(ii)).
255 H.R. 2779, Sec. 2(a) (adding 26 U.S.C. Sec. 4980H(e)(3)(B)(iii)).
256 U.S. Congress. House. House Education and Labor Committee. Rep. Robert E. Andrews Holds A
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transparency in the 401(k) system is unacceptable and must end now.”257
There was general agreement among the individuals who testified at the hearing that
there is a need for fee transparency. Agreement, however, ended there.
Some of the witnesses supported the bill’s requirement that vendors break out fees
for bundled services in a uniform manner rather than simply reporting the total cost.
For example,258 Alison Borland, a Retirement Strategy Leader with Hewitt Associates,
declared that “Plan fiduciaries cannot fulfill their obligations without clear and concise
fee disclosures from service providers.”259 She said that fees should be broken out for
various services and disclosed in a manner that allows for ready and consistent
comparison.260 She pointed out that Hewitt found that unbundling fees helped one
employer cut plan costs almost in half, from .30 percent of plan assets to .16 percent
of plan assets.261 She asserted that separate disclosure of investment management and
administration fees is particularly important.262
Julian Onorato, CEO, Expert Plan, Inc., testifying on behalf of the Council of
Independent 401(k) Plan Recordkeepers (CIKR), the American Society of Pension
Professionals & Actuaries (ASPPA), and the National Association of Independent Plan
Advisors (NAIRPA), also applauded the bill’s requirement that plan fees be broken
down and reported in a uniform manner. He contended that large vendors want to
report a single fee for competitive reasons. If bundled service providers are not
Hearing on the 401(k) Fair Disclosure For Retirement Security Act of 2009. 111th Cong., 1st sess., 24
April 2009.
257 Chairman Andrews Statement At Subcommittee Hearing on H.R. 1984, 401(k) Fair Disclosure for
Retirement Security Act of 2009 (April 22, 2009), available at http://edlabor.house.gov/hearings/2009/
04/401k-fair-disclosure-for-retir.shtml.
258 Kristi Mitchem, testifying on behalf of Barclays Global Investors, and Mercer E. Bullard,
President and Founder of Fund Democracy and Assistant Law Professor at University of Mississippi, also
favored the bill’s requirement that service providers make specific disclosure, by fee category, in a clear
and comparable manner. See Statement of Kristi Mitchem, Managing Director, Head of US Defined
Contribution, Barclays Global Investors, N.A., Before the Committee on Education and Labor, U.S.
House of Representatives , at 5–6 (April 22, 2009); Testimony of Mercer E. Bullard, President and
Founder, Fund Democracy, Inc. and Associate Professor of Law, University of Mississippi School of Law
before the Subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions Committee on Education and
Labor, U.S. House of Representatives, at 26–32 (April 22, 2009).
259 Testimony on Behalf of Hewitt Associates LLC by Alison T. Borland, Retirement Strategy
Leader, Before U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Education and Labor Subcommittee on
Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions Hearing on 401(k) Fair Disclosure for Retirement Security Act
of 2009, at 4 (April 22, 2009)
260 Id.
261 Id. at 5–6 (referring to “Company X”).
262 Id. at 4.
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required to break down the cost of services, they may claim that they can offer
retirement services for free while independent service providers must disclose their
cost of providing services. “Of, course, there is no ‘free lunch,’ and there is no such
thing as a free 401(k) plan.... By breaking down plan fees into only three simple
categories — investment management, recordkeeping and administration, and selling
costs and advisory fees — we believe plan sponsors will have the information they
need to satisfy their ERISA duties,” Mr. Onorato said.263
Larry Goldbrum, General Counsel for the SPARK Institute, objected to the bill’s
requirement that fees be broken down and reported in a uniform manner. He asserted,
“Not all fees fit neatly into categories and no single form or methodology can
adequately address the diversity of products and service structures without favoring
one segment of the industry over others.”264 He contended, “Market forces, industry
best practices, the threat of litigation, and the threat of regulatory enforcement actions
should drive industry behavior instead of legislative mandates. The SPARK Institute
believes that ultimately the bundled versus unbundled disclosure debate is more about
companies with different product structures, service models, product and service
capabilities, and pricing structures debating about market forces and competition than
alleged defects in disclosure of employer-sponsored retirement plan fees.”265
Similarly, in a written statement, the ERISA Industry Committee (ERIC) also
objected to a uniform breakdown of fees. According to the statement, “ERIC believes
that the requirement to provide individual costs in specific categories is not particularly
helpful and would lead to information that is not meaningful. It also raises significant
concerns as to how a service provider would disclose component costs for services that
are not offered outside a bundled contract.”266 Moreover, ERIC contends that it would
costly and unduly burdensome to disclose detailed costs and could “force the public
disclosure of proprietary information regarding contracts between service providers
and plan sponsors.”267
Robert Chambers, testifying on behalf of the American Benefits Counsel, raised
263 Statement by Julian Onorato, CEO of ExpertPlan, Inc., on behalf of CIKR, ASPPA, and NAIRPA,
Comments Presented to the Committee on Education and Labor Subcommittee on Health, Employment,
Labor and Pensions, United States House of Representatives, 401(k) Fair Disclosure for Retirement
Security Act of 2009, at 5 (April 22, 2009).
264 Testimony of Larry H. Goldbrum, Esq., General Counsel, The SPARK Institute Before the United
States House of Representatives Subcommittee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Regarding
“401(k) Fair Disclosure for Retirement Security Act of 2009,” at 3 (April 22, 2009)
265 Id. at 4.
266 Written Statement of the ERISA Industry Committee Before the U.S. House of Representatives
Education and Labor Committee in the Hearing on The 401(k) Fair Disclosure for Retirement Security
Act of 2009, at 4 (April 22, 2009)
267 Id.
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concerns about employers’ liability. He noted that there has been a great deal of
plan-related litigation lately and contended that employers should be protected against
additional unnecessary litigation resulting from new disclosure legislation.268 Among
the specific concerns he raised was potential liability in the event an employer
disclosed information provided by service providers that turned out to be inaccurate,
and the possibility that employers might make minor, inadvertent mistakes in
disclosures to participants.269 Chambers asked that plan sponsors be protected from
liability in such situations.270 Chambers also questioned the utility of unbundling for
purposes of disclosing costs to plan participants.271
Chambers and Goldbrum also questioned the bill’s requirement that plans include a
low cost passively managed index fund to qualify for limited liability under ERISA
Section 404(c).272 ERIC also objected to this requirement in its written statement.273
[5] Summary
At the time this Article went to press, three bills mandating greater disclosure of
401(k) plan fees had been introduced in the 111th Congress. All of the bills were
similar, though not identical, and would require that bundled service providers break
down their fees and disclose them in a uniform manner.
When hearings were held on similar bills in the 110th Congress, representatives of
the DOL urged Congress to let the DOL improve disclosure through its regulatory
projects rather than through legislation. Representative George Miller criticized the
DOL’s proposed regulations for permitting firms to continue to hide too many fees.
Unlike the proposed legislation, the proposed regulations would not require bundled
service providers to break down all fees.
It is too soon to tell whether any of the proposed bills will be enacted during the
111th Congress. Representative Miller has expressed a great deal of interest in seeing
such legislation enacted. Whether he will succeed in light of the strong objections of
large bundled service providers remains to be seen.
§ 17.05 CONCLUSION
Undoubtedly, 401(k) plan fees are important. Over a twenty year period, a one
268 Testimony of Robert G. Chambers on behalf of American Benefits Counsel Before the
Subcommittee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions of the U.S. House of Representatives Education
and Labor Committee for the Hearing on The 401(k) Fair Disclosure for Retirement Security Act of 2009,
at 3-4 (April 22, 2009)
269 Id. at 4–5.
270 Id.
271 Id. at 5.
272 See Chambers Testimony, at 5–6; Goldbrum Testimony, at 5.
273 ERIC Statement, at 7–8.
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percentage point increase in annual fees can reduce a participant’s account balance by
17 percent.274
Moreover, there is universal, or almost universal, agreement that plan fees should be
transparent. Consensus, however, ends there.
One of the most contentious issues in the plan fee debate is whether bundled service
providers should be required to break their fees down. Not surprisingly, bundled
service providers object to breaking down their fees. They contend that it would be
costly and of little value. Critics, in contrast, assert that a uniform breakdown of fees
is essential to permit a meaningful comparison between investment products.
Another significant issue in the 401(k) plan debate is the level of disclosure that
should be provided to plan fiduciaries versus the level of disclosure that should be
provided to plan participants. Notwithstanding the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’s
decision in Hecker v. Deere,275 almost everyone agrees that selecting investment
options is a fiduciary obligation, and plan fiduciaries should be provided with
sufficiently detailed plan fee information to enable plan fiduciaries to compare plan
fees in selecting investment options.
How much plan fee information should be disclosed to participants, however, is
subject to considerable debate. Currently, plan participants pay most plan fees; yet
most plan participants are unaware of the fact that they pay any plan fees. Critics of
the current system contend that participants can and should be provided with detailed
information about the fees they pay. Others argue that providing detailed information
to plan participants would be costly and of little value. At best, participants would
ignore the information; at worst, they would be paralyzed by too much information.
There is much truth to the SPARK Institute’s assertion that at its very heart, the plan
fee controversy is a dispute about the propriety of the business model underlying the
current retirement system. The SPARK Institute asserts that the marketplace works to
regulate service providers’ behavior and ensures that services providers are not making
undue profits from retirement plans.
While the market may limit service providers’ profits, it is not clear that the market
is really working. In its white paper, The Case For Employer-Sponsored Retirement
Plans: Fees and Expenses, the Spark Institute declares that “the fees agreed to by
employers who sponsor retirement plans and charged to American workers who
participate in those plans are fair and reasonable when considering all of the services
274 See GAO Report, supra note 68, at 7 (noting that an individual account with a $20,000 balance
and a net return of 6.5 percent per year will grow to about $70,500 in 20 years while increasing fees by
one percentage point to reduce the net return to 5.5 percent per year will result in the $20,000 account
balance only growing to $58,400 over 20 years.).
275 For a discussion of the Hecker v. Deere decision, see Section 17.03[2] supra.
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that are provided.”276 Its list of services commonly provided includes “record keeping
— including 24-hour access to account information” and “phone/call center support
with representatives available to assist participants for at least 10 hours per day.”277
Are those services, and other services not listed, such as daily investment transfers,
really necessary? Would plan participants demand those services if they realized they
were paying for them?278
Perhaps more importantly, and more fundamentally, 401(k) plan fees include the
cost of employee education. If participants knew that they were paying to be educated
on how to invest their plan assets, would they, and should they,279 demand that we
return to a system where experts invest retirement savings rather than requiring
individuals to direct their own individual accounts?
Mandating full unbundled disclosure of plan fees could fundamentally change the
retirement world as we know it. What would take its place, however, is not clear.
276 The SPARK Institute, Inc., supra note 19, at 5 (emphasis added).
277 Id. at 7.
278 Some legal experts and other expert fiduciaries have concluded modern services for individual
account plans are sold to plan sponsors as a need to justify the platform that in turn justifies additional
fees. Statistics show not only that these new costs place a heavy strain on participant accounts, but that
participant-direction itself has proven to be a costly failure, hurting millions of future retirees.
Matthew D. Hutcheson, supra note 2, at 377.
279 For arguments against participant-directed plans, see Hutcheson, supra note 2; Susan J. Stabile,
Freedom to Choose Unwisely: Congress’ Misguided Decision to Leave Participants to their Own
Devices, 11 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Policy 361 (2002).
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